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Systems implementation is inherently a political process. However, the majority of the literature in the 
area of systems implementation takes a simplistic look at factors attributed to success. These studies 
provide empirical evidence that "human factors" such as "top management support" contribute to a 
successful implementation. Rather than accept this, we challenge this view and explore two "human" 
issues - power and legitimacy inside systems implementation. By exploring the implementation of a 
learning management system at the University of New Zealand, issues such as power and legitimacy 
affect the wayan implementation team collaborates. Systems implementation is a complex and messy 
process and we need to understand the implementation process, acknowledging that top management 
support is not always necessary to "successfully" implement a system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Systems implementation is the process of identifying the need for an information system of some kind, 
and the process( es) involved in getting that system installed into an organisation (Nickerson, 2001; 
Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003; Maddison et a!., 1983; Davis, 1974; Hawryszkiewycz, 2001; Hoffer, 
Valacich, and George, 1998; Lauden and Lauden, 1998). Research into the area of systems 
implementation has provided the majority of early studies in the discipline of information systems and 
typically falls into two categories: process modelling and the systems development lifecycle (SDLC); 
and factor studies (Newman and Robey, 1992). Rather than focus on the implementation process, 
which has been covered extensively by various authors such as Avison and Fitzgerald (2003), 
Hawryszkiewycz (2001) and Hoffer, et a!. (1998), we are going to focus on the factors required for 
implementation. 
One approach to studies of implementation in inforri'iation systems has focused on factor studies. The 
failure of information systems implementation has been linked to the absence of an IS champion or 
change agent, lack of management suppOli (Ginzberg, 1981; Kydd, 1989; Corbitt, 2000), strain on 
already restricted managerial time (Cragg and King, 1983), poor attitudes towards Information Systems 
(Corbitt, 1997), absence of education and training (Cragg and King, 1983), organizational problems 
(Markus, 1983), technical problems (Cragg and King, 1983), and perceived gaps between expectations 
of IS supporters and those expected to use the system (Kydd, 1989). On the other hand, research has 
shown that success in implementing IS in business organisations is more common than failure (Kydd, 
1989). 
Success in implementing systems is attributable to a number of success factors (Rockart, 1982; Somers 
and Nelson, 2001; Boon, et a!., 2004). These include organizational commitment, the existence of an 
executive sponsor within the organization (Raymond, 1985), the existence of an operating sponsor 
within the organization to provide quick feedback across the organization (Montazemi, 1988) and the 
existence of dedicated facilities within the organization. In the small business context, (Cragg and 
King, 1983) suggest that the successful implementation of IT occurs where there is demonstrated 
relative advantage in terms of time saved, benefits accrued or discomfort decreased, and where 
competitive pressure could be addressed as IT was seen as an enabling technology that could make the 
firm flexible and profitable. A similar argument is offered by Allen and Kem (2002) in the higher 
education context. Finally, the central impOliance of the role of management is supported by Parr, et al. 
(1999), Duchessi, et al. (1989), Somers and Nelson (2001), Akkermans and Heiden (2002), Poon and 
Wagner (2001), Averweg and Erwin (1999), Hartman and Ashrafi (2002), and Teo and Ang (1999). 
Corbitt, et aI., (1997) argue that by demonstrating theTelative advantage of implementing a new system 
in terms of time saved, benefits accrued or discomfoii decreased and where competitive pressure could 
be addressed by technology, enable a successful systems implementation. Current research in the 
systems implementation process has taken a positivist approach. According to Mitev (2001), this 
approach is typically taken by managers and technologists and is impractical as it views technology as 
unproblematic and neutral. That is, technology has little or no impact on the systems implementation 
success or failure. In other words, it ignores or reduces the "understanding of organisations 
characterised by a belief in rational management; a denial of the existence of power relations and 
conflicts; a tendency to see organisations as individual closed entities; and limited focus on the 
business environment" (Mitev, 2001, p. 85). 
Such factor studies, as described above, are not reflective of the process which occurs in systems 
implementation. Implementation is neither driven entirely by factors of success or failure (Corbitt, 
1997). Rather the implementation process in information systems is more reflective of the stakeholder 
relationship interactions and the impact of the context, either business, organizational, social or 
cultural, in which the implementation occurs. However, these conceptualisations ignore the political 
spectre and the element of power in systems implementation. As a result, some authors have taken a 
more social-technical approach to information systems implementation (Mitev, 2001; Orlikowski, 
1992). In order to do this, we as researchers, must "move beyond commonsense explanations of failure 
and success and find more complex and richer ways of understanding the use of IS in organisations 
through the inclusion of broader social, economic, political, cultural and historical factors" (Mitev, 
2001, p. 84). By taking this approach, we can enable a better understanding of the power and politics 
involved in systems implementation by focusing on social issues in the implementation process. 
Rather than take the social aspect of systems implementation at face value, we need to understand and 
perform research that recognises the complexity and historical construction of the members of the 
implementation team and process (Mitev, 2001). We currently cannot describe or explain the political 
environment in systems implementation because politics in implementation endures influence, 
pressure, dogma, expediency, conflict compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and 
pragmatism (Ball, 1990). That is, the implementation process is complex, messy, inconsistent, 
ambiguous and contains dilemmas. 
The result of factor studies has been to create a list of critical success factors involved in systems 
implementation. That is, celiain objectives or factors need to be addressed in order for the project to be 
considered successful (Rockart, 1979; Boynton and Zmud, 1984; Martin, 1982; Zahedi, 1987; Soliman, 
Clegg, and Tantoush, 2001). Previous work has addressed the most common critical success factors in 
systems implementation (Boon, et aI., 2004). The five most common factors in systems implementation 
are top management support, clear goals and objectives, business process reengineering (BPR), project 
management, and information technology. It is interesting to note that three of the five common 
success factors involved human factors of some kind. EmelY (1971) initially discusses the human 
factors in systems implementation, however, there has been little added to the literature and body of 
knowledge in regards to human factors in systems implementation. 
Human factors make up some of the more significant CSFs, such as having top management suppOli, a 
project champion driving the project, as well competent project teams (Havelka and Lee, 2002; Somers 
and Nelson, 2001; Boynton and Zmud, 1984; Akkermans and HeIden, 2002; Bergeron and Begin, 
1986; Hmiman and Ashrafi, 2002; Croteau and Li, 2003). Human factors also include having the 
appropriate IS staff, with skills for the project and an empathy for supporting of users (Teo and Ang, 
1999; Pollalis and Frieze, 1993; Khandelwal and Ferguson, 1999). 
There are the political issues inside systems implementation that only a qualitative study can uncover. 
Issues such as power occurs in the systems implementation process as it is the inherent political nature 
of people. People are not comfortable with change. Change is essentially a political process requiring 
the capacity to mobilise power resources (Mitev, 2001). 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF POWER, POLITICS AND LEGITIMACY 
The word politics emanates a negative feeling to many people. Organisational politics is sometimes a 
misunderstood concept because there is no apparent, straightforward definition of it (Buchanan and 
Badham, 1999; Bacharach and Lawler, 1998). Some authors classify organisational politics as upward 
forms of influence or as self-serving tactics of influence such ingratiation (Mintzberg, 1983). Buchanan 
and Badham (1999, p. 11) state that organisational politics are "the practical domain of power in action, 
worked through the use of techniques of influence and other tactics." Similarly, Bacharach and Lawler 
(1998, p. 69) define organisational politics as "the effOlis of individuals or groups in organisations to 
mobilise support for or opposition to organisational strategies, policies, or practices in which they have 
a stake or interest." Whatever the definition, there is one relationship that holds: the inextricable link 
between power and politics (Buchanan and Badham, 1999; Markus, 1983; Bacharach and Lawler, 
1998). That is, you cannot have one without considering or discussing the other. If politics is the way 
that people get things done, then power is the resource used to achieve this. 
When bringing this into an Information Systems context, the following question is raised: do people 
take power and politics for granted when it comes to systems implementation? Do we choose to ignore 
it and, as raised earlier, focus on the critical success factors necessary for a "successful" 
implementation? Since Markus' (1983) seminal paper, there have been few studies that have continued 
her work in power, politics and systems implementation. 
Having defined organisational politics, it is now time to define the term power. Again, this is a term 
that has different understandings (Parsons, 1963; Galbraith, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981). Perhaps the most 
common view of power is the structuralist view, which is systematic and almost a simplistic way of 
understanding power. According to Dahl (1968, p. 202) "A has power over B to the extent that he can 
get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." Dahl (1957) refers to power as controlling of 
someone else's behaviour and/or actions. Russell (1975) share Dahl's view, however, Russell (1975) 
describes how individuals may influence or be influenced via the use of power. These methods are: 
• direct physical power over an opponent's body - which refers to physical damage via the use 
of a weapon to get their way; 
• by rewards and punishments as inducements - the use of incentives, such as monetary reward 
or punishment by removing privileges; and 
• by influence on opinion - the use of propaganda to modify an opponent's mind set. 
Putting this into an organisation context, power can take on multiple forms (French and Raven, 1959): 
• Coercive Power - a person reacts to this power out of fear of the negative ramifications that 
might result if they fail to comply. 
• Reward Power - compliance achieved based on the ability to distribute rewards that others 
view as valuable. 
• Legitimate Power - the power a person receives as a result of their position in the formal 
hierarchy of an organisation. 
• Expeli Power - influence based on special skills or knowledge. 
• Referent Power - influence based on possession by an individual of desirable resources or 
personal traits. . 
Again, this is a simple view of power, and enables a researcher to easily categorise the type of power 
and role someone may have in the organisation. 
The view of power adopted here is the anti-structuralist view of power, shared by authors such as 
Clegg (1989), Foucault (1977,1978,1982) and Lukes (1974). This view of power takes the view that 
power is fluid, non-static, that is, power is not an absolute telW. This follows Foucault's (1978) notion 
of power relations. In one of his later works, Foucault (1982, p. 220) delves further into the concept of 
power relations offering "what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action, or mode of 
conduct, which does not act immediately and directly on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future." 
As mentioned earlier, power is never static, never standing still, rather, it is fluid and constantly 
changing. It should be noted however, that people do not 'have' power implicitly; rather, power is a 
technique or action that individuals can engage in. Power is not possessed, it is exercised (Foucault, 
1977, 1978). A power relation only occurs where there is the potentiality for resistance, that is to say it 
only arises between two individuals each of whom has the potential to influence the actions of the other 
and to present resistance to this influence. 
We are not born with power, but we may (or may not for that matter) come into power at some stage in 
our lives. Foucault (1978, p. 94) confirms this by stating, "power is not something that is acquired, 
seized or shared, something that one holds onto or allows to slip away." These power relations are not 
static, but dynamic, transforming and constantly changing (McNay, 1994). Foucault claims that power 
is transformable, that we may have power at one point in our life and then at another point in our life 
have no power. Foucault (1978, p. 93) states that power "is produced from one moment to the next, at 
every point, or rather in evelY relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it 
embraces evelything, but because it comes from evelywhere." 
Foucault (1978, p. 100) suggests that it is in discourse that power relations can be established. And for 
this velY reason, we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical 
function is neither uniform nor stable. According to Ball (1990, p. 17), discourses are, "about what can 
be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority." Foucault 
(1977, p. 49) further elaborates, stating that discourses are "practices that systematically fonn the 
objects of which they speak ... Discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they 
constitute them in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention." Discourses represent meaning 
and social relationships; they fonn both subjectivity and power relations. 
In the context of systems implementation, power may affect the process of implementing the learning 
management system, by making it a messy, complex and convoluted process. Throughout the 
implementation process, power may swing from one way to another, and there may be no clear 
recognition of the static, categorical forms of power, as French and Raven (1959) claim. It is through 
the concept of power relations, as described by Foucault (1978) that we can gain a greater 
understanding of the power and politics involved wit~ systems implementation. 
Implementations of Information Systems are usually intended as a durable social change; they have to 
be legitimate (Banville, 1991). As stated by Markus and Bj0rn-Andersen (1987, p. 502), "awareness 
and the perceived legitimacy of power exercise will affect users' responses to professionals and their 
acceptance of the solutions professionals' purpose." The ideal situation to observe legitimation 
processes is when there is a potential crisis in legitimation, that is when one can focus on critical 
situation (i.e. when the social routines are disrupted arid the implicit becomes problematic). 
RESEARCH METHOD 
To enable a better understanding of the implementation process and answer the research question, what 
is the role of power, politics and legitimacy in systems implementation? An ethnographic approach was 
employed, as this enabled the researcher to get into the organisation and be a participant for part of the 
implementation process. This also enabled the researcher to describe the organisation from the 
members point-of-view, reducing the distance between the researcher and the members of the study. 
By immersing themselves in the organisational activities, the researcher will gain richer information as 
to how power relations are created and how they may transform over time for the systems 
implementation group. As Foucault (1978) indicated, power relations transfonn over time. An 
ethnographic study will therefore uncover these transfOlming power relations. 
Twenty face-to-face, one-on-one interviews were held with the members of the implementation team 
and documents were collected to provide further information as well as written, hard facts that confirm 
what was said in the interviews. This approach was adopted as the researchers took the role of the 
"traveller" (Kvale, 1996). That is, we wanted to tell the story, through the eyes of the implementation 
team members, their joumey, wandering through the landscapes entering into conversations with 
people encountered, roaming and exploring unknown territory. 
Data was analysed using a combination of henneneutics, organising systems and discourse analysis. 
The researcher read the complete transcript of each interview and document before analysing the 
transcript for the creation and transfOlmation of power relations within the systems implementation 
group. Data was initially coded into as many categories as possible focusing on the "events" as the 
appropriate unit of analysis (Creswell, 1994; Leedy; 1997). The researcher then "organised, al1'anged 
and chronologically ordered the data searching for recul1'ing themes or pattems that represent the 
members' perspective. Discourse analysis was also employed to make sense of, and analyse the 
collected interviews and documents. According to (Fairclough, 2001, p. 25) discourse analysis "has a 
common concem with how language interconnects with other elements of social life, and especially a 
concern with how language figures in unequal relations of power, in processes of exploitation and 
domination of some people by others." That is, discourse analysis allows the researcher to understand 
the language and authority of members involved with the study. As a result, the researcher put forth a 
set of relational asseliions about the culture using the language and terminology of the members" 
(Leedy, 1997, p. 160). 
CASE STUDY 
The University of New Zealand (UNZ) is an amalgamation of institutions throughout New Zealand that 
has five faculties: Commerce, Humanities, Arts, Law, and Science. The strategic goal of University of 
New Zealand is to be the best provider of distance education in New Zealand, and it is through the 
implementation of a learning management system that this goal will be achieved. Twenty members 
were involved in the study, with a representative of each Faculty and the main administrative services 
depaJiments, the Information Technology Department and Teaching and Learning Department, as well 
as key members of the Senior Executive. 
In 1998 a decision was made to implement a Learning Management System (LMS) at the University of 
New Zealand. This decision was made via a committee of six university members, academics and 
senior executive, and mmours were mnning that the system had actually been selected prior to the 
committee forming. This decision was supposed to be for the whole university with the idea that there 
would be one central learning management system, to enable a sense of unity across the dispersed 
University of New Zealand. The decision was made to use QuickLearn at the learning management 
system. 
However, at the time QuickLearn was selected by the committee, each faculty had made a move to 
implement their own learning management system. Commerce had developed its own internal system, 
as had Humanities. The Faculty of Science were using a mixture of systems depending on the school. 
Some schools had adopted QuickLearn, other schools had developed their own system, and yet more 
schools were using either EducateMe or EasyTeach. The Faculty of Arts implemented QuickLearn and 
the Faculty of Law had implemented EasyTeach. 
There was a lot of chaos involved with the implementation of QuickLearn and little or almost no 
contralisation, which was the goal of the LMS, had been achieved. At this time, it was discovered that 
QuickLearn reneged on most of its promises it had originally made upon confirming the contract. 
According to all members involved, QuickLearn was "moving away from the educational market and 
more towards the corporate market." Those that had ,peen using QuickLearn had also found the system 
cumbersome and non user friendly. It was at one Academic Board meeting that a member of staff, and 
user of both QuickLearn and EasyTeach, made pjlblic the general dissatisfaction that went with 
QuickLearn. 
As the matter was now public and the senior executive had been made aware of the dissatisfaction, 
moves were now made to resolve and restore satisfaction into one learning management system. At this 
stage however, there was a perceived weakness at th,e senior executive level. The Vice-Chancellor at 
the time was on the verge of retirement and there wa$. a Deputy Vice-Chancellor who was criticised for 
their inexperience in regards to the online learning,and in particular, learning management systems. 
However, this inexperience was also linked to the, senior executive being misinformed about the 
requirements of the learning management system" and the way it was implemented. The Vice-
Chancellor and the Deputy Vice-Chancellor had,',been the ones pushing for a central learning 
management system, without understanding what is really required from such a system. 
As a result, the whole process of selecting and implementing a LMS was "painfully revisited" and the 
University of New Zealand went back to square one, wanting one learning management system. A new 
committee was established with a completely new team. The chair of this new committee saw the 
QuickLearn "fiasco" and knew there was a better way of selecting and implementing a learning 
management system. Rather than had a small selection team, as was used for the QuickLearn 
implementation, the chair wanted to have as many people as possible involved to increase the user buy 
in, and ultimately the success of the new system. As a result, members of each Faculty were selected by 
the chair, as well as the Dean of each faculty nominating his or her own members. Members from the 
two SuppOliing service depaJiments, the Teaching and Learning Department and the Information 
Technology DepaJiment were also on the selection and implementation team to input any IT 
requirements and teaching and learning requirements and resources. 
Meetings were hostile, due to the nature of the committee. Each faculty member was pushing for their 
own system that they had been using inside their faculty and rejecting every other potential system. The 
chair of the committee decided to ignore what had been done previously and what each faculty and 
school had been using. Instead, the chair found all potential learning management systems that exist, 
producing a comprehensive list of64 systems. A list of functionality was also generated by members of 
the committee. This process had a lot of involvement and was non-political. It gave everyone the 
0ppOliunity to say what they though a learning management system should do. This list was then ShOli-
listed, using the requirements as the criteria list. Three major competitors were left: EducateOnline, 
ChalkItUpOnline and EasyTeach. 
As the short-list was generated, an argument regarding pedagogy ensued. Those that were pushing for 
EasyTeach believed that the learning management system should revolve around communication. That 
is, students should be able to chat with one another, regardless of location. Other committee members 
believed that the learning management system should be based on technology, and its potential uses. 
EducateOnline offered the ability to link the database into other internal systems. The third learning 
management system, ChalkItUpOnline, was believed to have been the best system for teaching. Each 
advocate kept pushing for their own system and continually rejecting any other system, despite the 
capabilities of those systems. 
However, the argument turned out to be pointless as it was at one significant meeting EasyTeach was 
eliminated from the selection. Unbeknown to the EasyTeach advocates, and many others on the 
committee, it turned out that EasyTeach was moving away from the tertiary sector and following 
QuickLearn by moving into the corporate market. The EasyTeach advocated were devastated and 
essentially defeated. They could no longer push for EasyTeach to be the system. Two systems were left 
and after more debate and presentations from both companies, EducateOnline was selected. 
The decision was unanimous and went forward to tqe senior executive and university council. As the 
decision was made by such a large committee, and unanimous, the university council had little choice 
but to accept the decision and grant permission and provide funding to start piloting and 
implementation the new learning management system, EducateOnline. This process appeared to be the 
least political involved in the entire selection and implementation process. 
Shortly after the decision had been made, there were a few changes at the senior executive level. The 
Vice-Chancellor retired and a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed. This Vice-Chancellor had a greater 
understanding on online teaching and learning and wanted to speed up the implementation process, by 
decreasing the implementation time from 18 months to six months. At approximately the same time, 
the Deputy Vice-Chancellor resigned and a new Deputy Vice-Chancellor was appointed, with a greater 
knowledge of online teaching and learning and learning management systems. In conjunction with 
these new appointments, a new position, Pro Vice-Chancellor for online teaching and learning was 
pushed for by the outgoing Deputy Vice-Chancellor and embraced by both the new Vice-Chancellor 
and Deputy Vice-Chancellor. The responsibility for the Pro Vice-Chancellor was solely in regards to 
the University of New Zealand's online system, particularly the new learning management system. The 
Pro Vice-Chancellor had to encourage the adoption of the learning management system across the 
university and deal with all dissatisfaction and general complaints of the new system. 
In late 2002, piloting of the new system started, and with this started the politicking. The nay-sayers 
and supporters of EasyTeach spoke out again, slamming the decision and the system. Those that were 
not involved in the selection process now had no choice but to use this one system. The senior 
executive made the decision to decommission all other learning management systems operating in the 
university. Ultimately the academic population felt that this system was "imposed" on them. The union 
was brought in with claims that learning how to use the system was infringing on workloads and being 
overloaded and over-stressed by having to learn how to use a completely new system in a ShOli space 
of time. 
Since the pilot and implementation, the system has been operating across the entire university for seven 
months. There have been technical difficulties along the way. Users, both academic and student, 
continually complained about the slow speed of the system, and the fact that it was not as good as 
previous systems they had used in various faculties and schools. However, the system has survived a 
summer semester and one full semester with over 33,600 total users logging on during the first half of 
the semester." 
Implementation of the Learning Management System 
Although the story was simplified and shortened, the political processes and power struggles are 
strongly apparent. This story is not so much a story about the implementation of a central learning 
management system, but more a struggle of control. Discourses were initially set by the weak senior 
executive of 1998, whereby an online learning management system was required, however, there was 
little understanding of what the system should be capable of doing, and its impact on the university. 
Because of the weak understanding and lack of leadership, a vacuum was created, where various senior 
members of the faculties and managers of the Teaching and Learning Depmiment and the Information 
Technology Department, exerted their power and created their own discourse. 
There was a realisation that various schools and faculties had been using their own systems and 
running them off their own servers. However, it wasn't until the new Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-
Chancellor and Pro Vice-Chancellor appointments that control was ultimately put back into the hands 
of the senior executive. These members could stand up at any meeting and essentially say "this is the 
way we are going to do it." They ultimately had the power and wiped out any prior stations of control. 
Rather than challenge any existing discourses, the senior executive decided to create their own and 
have all members of the university, depmiments and faculties alike, abide and adhere to the new 
discourse, power and ultimately, control. 
What are the lessons that can be learned from this implementation? This paper has argued, and made 
explicitly clear that power and politics are apparent and run rampant throughout the system 
implementation process. The literature on critical success factors is inadequate as it takes a structured 
view of the world. That is, we can easily categorise various aspects of the implementation process, and, 
if we have adopted these factors, then we can successfully implement a system. This is essentially a 
simplistic approach to systems implementation and critical success factors. This is fmiher evidenced by 
the framework of bases of power as proposed by French and Raven (1959). Instead, we have argued 
that power is transferable and constantly moving, adopting the concept of power relations as 
established by Foucault (1977, 1979, 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The literature on critical success factors is limited as it suggests that there is a factor called "human 
factors," which includes components such as top management suppoti and project leadership. This 
paper has uncovered and discussed in-depth, the inherent human factors, and essentially political nature 
of systems implementation. We acknowledge that the systems implementation process is complex and 
messy and the previous literature does not refer to this. 
We have contributed to the systems implementation and associated factor studies, by gaining a greater 
understanding of the human factors, or more specifically, the political nature of the implementation 
process. By understanding the true needs of the system, in this case control, it indicates that project 
leadership and top management support is not alwayspecessaty to "successfully" implement a system. 
:/ 
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